DYVOUR'S HABIT

DYVOUR'S HABIT

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DYVOUR'S HABIT. Scotch law. A habit which debtors, who are set free on a cessio bonorum, are obliged to wear, unless in the summons and process of cessio, it be libelled, sustained, and proved that the bankruptcy proceeds from misfortune. And bankrupts are condemned to submit to the habit, even where no suspicion of fraud lies against them, if they have been dealers in an illicit trade. Ersk. Pr. L. Scot. 4, 3, 13. This practice was bottomed on that of the Roman civil law, which Filangierl says is better fitted to excite laughter than compassion. He adds: " Si conduce il debitore vicino ad una colonna a quest officio destinata, egli l'abbraccia nel mentre, che uno araldo grida Cedo bonis ed un al tro gli abza le vesti, e palesa agli spettatori le sue natiche. Finita questa ceremonia il debitore messo in liberta." Filangieri della legislazione, cap. iv.

UNJUST

UNJUST

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UNJUST. That which is done against the perfect rights of another;

that which is against the established law; that which is opposed to a law which is the test of right and wrong. 1 Toull. tit. prel. n. 5; Aust. Jur. 276, n.; Hein. Lec. El. §1080.

USAGE

USAGE

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USAGE. Long and uniform practice. In its most extensive meaning this term includes custom and prescription, though it differs from them in a narrower sense, it is applied to the habits, modes, and course of dealing which are observed in trade generally, as to all mercantile transactions, or to some particular branches of trade.

2. Usage of trade does not require to be immemorial to establish it; if it be known, certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law, it is sufficient. But evidence of a few instances that such a thing has been done does not establish a usage. 3 Watts, 178; 3 Wash. C. C. R. 150; 1 Gallis. 443; 5 Binn. 287; 9 Pick. 426; 4 B. & Ald. 210; 7 Pet. 1; 2 Wash. C. C. R. 7.

3. The usages of trade afford ground upon which a proper construction may be given to contracts. By their aid the indeterminate intention of parties and the nature and extent of their contracts arising from mere implications or presumptions, and act of an equivocal character may be ascertained; and the meaning of words and doubtful expressions may become known. 2 Mete. 65; 2 Sumn. 569; 2 G. & J. 136; 13 Pick. 182; Story on Ag. §77; 2 Kent, Com. 662, 3d ed.; 5 Wheat. 326; 2 Car. & P. 525; 3 B. & Ald. 728; Park. on Ins. 30; 1 Marsh. Ins. 186, n. 20; 1 Caines, 45 Gilp. 356, 486; 1 Edw. Ch. R. 146; 1 N. & M. 519; 15 Mass. 433; 1 Rill, R. 270; Wright, R. 573; Pet. C. C. R. 230; 5 Hamm. 436 6 Pet. 715; 2 Pet. 148; 6 Porter, 123 1 Hall, 612; 9 Mass. 155; 9 Wheat. 582 11 Wheat. 430; 1 Pet. 25, 89.

4. Courts will not readily adopt these usages, because they are not unfrequently founded in mistake. 2 Sumn. 377. See 3 Chitt. Pr. 55; Story, Confl. of Laws, §270; 1 Dall. 178; Vaugh. 169, 383; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t.

SOURCES OF THE LAW

SOURCES OF THE LAW

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SOURCES OF THE LAW: By this expression is understood the authority from which the laws derive their force.

2. The power of making all laws is in the people or - their representatives, and none can have any force whatever, which is derived from any other source. But it is not required that the legislator shall expressly pass upon all laws, and give the sanction of his seal, before they can have life or existence. The laws are therefore such as have received ala express sanction, and such as de-rive their force and effect from implication. The first, or express, are the constitution of the United States, and the treaties and acts of the legislature which have been made by virtue of the authority vested by the constitution. To these must be added the constitution of the state and the laws made by the state legislature, or by other subordinate legislative bodies, by virtue of the authority conveyed by such constitution. The latter, or tacit, received their effect by the general use of them by the people, when they assume the name of customs by the adoption of rules by the courts from systems of foreign laws.

3. The express laws, are first, the constitution of the United States; secondly, the treaties made with foreign powers; thirdly, the acts of congress; fourthly, the constitutions of the respective states; fifthly, the laws made by the several state legislatures; sixthly, laws made by inferior legislative bodies, such as the councils of municipal corporations, and general rules made by the courts.

4. - 1. The constitution is an act of the people themselves, made by their representatives elected for that purpose. It is the supreme law of the land, and is binding on all future legislative bodies, until it shall be altered by tho authority of the people, in the manner, provided for in the instrument itself, and if an act be passed contrary to the provisions of the constitution, it is, ipso facto, void. 2 Pet. 522; 12 Wheat. 270; 2 Dall. 309; 3 Dall. 386; 4 Dall. 18; 6 Cranch, 128.

5. - 2. Treaties made under the authority of the constitution are declared to be the supreme law of the land, and therefore obligatory on courts. 1 Cranch, 103. See Treaty.

6. - 3. The acts and resolutions of congress enacted constitutionally, are of course binding as laws and require no other explanation.

7. - 4. The constitutions of the respective states, if not opposed to the provisions of the constitution of the United States, are of binding force in the states respectively, and no act of the state legislature has any force which is made in contravention of the state constitution.

8. - 5. The laws of the several states, constitutionally made by the state legislatures, have full and complete authority in the respective states.

9. - 6. Laws are frequently made by inferior legislative bodies which are authorized by the legislature; such are the municipal councils of cities or boroughs. Their laws are generally known by the name of ordinances, and, when lawfully ordained, they are binding on the people. The courts, perhaps by a necessary usurpation, have been in the practice of making general rules and orders, which sometime affect suitors and parties as much as the most regular laws enacted by congress. These apply to all future cases. There are also rules made in particular cases as they arise, but these are rather decrees or judgments than laws.

10. The tacit laws, which derive their authority from the consent of the people, without any legislative enactment, may be subdivided into 1st. The common law, which is derived from two sources, the common law of England, and the practice and decisions of our own courts. It is very difficult, in many cases, to ascertain what is this common law, and it is always embarrassing to the courts. Kirl. Rep. Pref. In some states, it has been enacted that the common law of England shall be the law, except where the same is inconsistent with our constitutions and laws. See Law.

2d. Customs which have been generally adopted by the people, have the force of law.

3d. The principles of the Roman law, being generally founded in superior wisdom, have insinuated themselves into every part of the law. Many of the refined rules which now adorn the common law appear there without any acknowledgment of their paternity, and it is at this source that some judges dipt to get the wisdom which adorns their judgments. The proceedings of the courts of equity and many of the admirable distinctions which manifest their wisdom are derived from this source. To this fountain of wisdom the courts of admiralty owe most of the law which governs in admiralty cases.

4th. The canon law, which was adopted by the ecclesiastical courts, figures in our laws respecting marriage, divorces, wills and testaments, executors and administrators and many other subjects.

5th. The jurisprudence, or decisions of the various courts, have contributed their full share of what makes the law. These decisions are made by following precedents, by borrowing from the sources already mentioned, and, sometimes by the less excusable disposition of the judges to legislate on the bench.

11. The monuments where the common law is to be found, are the records, reports of cases adjudicated by the courts, and the treatises of learned men. The books of reports are the best proof of what is the common law, but owing to the difficulty of finding out any systematic arrangement, recourse is had to treatises upon the various branches of the law. The records, owing to their being kept in one particular place, and therefore not generally accessible, are seldom used.

SELF-DEFENCE

SELF-DEFENCE

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SELF-DEFENCE, crim. law. The right to protect one's person and property from injury.

2. It will be proper to consider, 1. The extent of the right of self-defence. 2. By whom it may be exercised. 3. Against whom. 4. For what causes.

3. - 1. As to the extent of the right, it may be laid down, first, that when threatened violence exists, it is the duty of the person threatened to use all, prudent and precautionary measures to prevent the attack; for example, if by closing a door which was usually left open, one could prevent an attack, it would be prudent, and perhaps the law might require, that it should be closed, in order to preserve the peace, and the aggressor might in such case be held to bail for his good behaviour; secondly, if, after having taken such proper precautions, a party should be assailed, he may undoubtedly repel force by force, but in most instances cannot, under the pretext that he has been attacked, use force enough to kill the assailant or hurt him after he has secured himself from danger; as, if a person unarmed enters a house to commit a larceny, while there he does not threaten any one, nor does any act which manifests an intention to hurt any one, and there are a number of persons present, who may easily secure him, no one will be justifiable to do him any injury, much less to kill him; he ought to be secured and delivered to the public authorities. But when an attack is made by a thief under such circumstances, and it is impossible to ascertain to what extent he may push it, the law does not requite the party assailed to weigh with great nicety the probable extent of the attack, and he may use the most violent means against his assailant, even to the taking of his life. For homicide may be excused, se defendendo, where a man has no other probable means of preserving his life from one who attacks him, while in the commission of a felony, or even on a sudden quarrel, he beats him, so that he is reduced to this inevitable necessity. Hawk. bk. 2, c. 11, s. 13. And the reason is that when so reduced, he cannot call to his aid the power of society or of the commonwealth, and, being unprotected by law, he reassumes his natural rights, which the law sanctions, of killing his adversary to protect himself. Toull. Dr. Civ. Fr. ]iv. 1, tit. 1, n. 210. See Pamph. Rep. of Selfridge's Trial in 1806 2 Swift's Ev. 283.

4. - 2. The party attacked may undoubtedly defend himself, and the law further sanctions the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the near relations of hushand and wife, patent and child, and master and servant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these his relations, be forcibly attacked in their person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force, for the law in these cases respects the passions of the human mind, and makes, it lawful in him, when external violence is offered to himself, or to those to whom he bears so near a connexion, to do that immediate justice to which he is prompted by nature, and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain. 2 Roll. Ab. 546; 1 Chit. Pr. 592.

5. - 3. The party making the attack may be resisted, and if several persons join in such attack they may all be resisted, and one may be killed although he may not himself have given the immediate cause for such killing, if by his presence and his acts, he has aided the assailant. See Conspiracy.

6. - 4. The cases for which a man may defend himself are of two kinds; first, when a felony is attempted, and, secondly, when, no felony is attempted or apprehended.

7. - 1st. A man may defend himself, and even commit a homicide for the prevention of any forcible and atrocious crime, which if completed would amount to a felony; and of course under the like circumstances, mayhem, wounding and battery would be excusable at common law. 1 East, P. C. 271; 4 Bl. Com. 180. A man may repel force by force in defence of his person, property or habitation, against any one who manifests, intends, attempts, or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a forcible felony, such as murder, rape, robbery, arson, burglary and the like. In these cases he is not required to retreat, but he may resist, and even pursue his adversary, until he has secured himself from all danger.

8. - 2d. A man may defend himself when no felony has been threatened or attempted; 1. When the assailant attempts to beat another and there is no mutual combat; as, where one meets another and attempts to commit or does commit an assault and battery on him, the person attacked may defend himself; and an offer or, attempt to strike another, when sufficiently near, so that that there is danger, the person assailed may strike first, and is not required to wait until he has been struk. Bull. N. P. 18; 2 Roll. Ab. 547. 2. When there is a mutual combat upon a sudden quarrel. In these cases both parties are the aggressors; and if in the fight one is killed it will be manslaughter at least, unless the survivor can prove two things: 1st. That before the mortal stroke was given be had refused any further combat, and had retreated as far as he could with safety; and 2d. That he killed his adversary from necessity, to avoid his own destruction.

9. A man may defend himself against animals, and he may during the attack kill them, but not afterwards. 1 Car. & P. 106; 13 John. 312; 10 John. 365.

10. As a general rule no man is allowed to defend himself with force if he can apply to the law for redress, and the law gives him a complete remedy, See Assault; Battery; Necessity; Trespass.