2. This the latter is not permitted to divulge, for this is the privilege of the client and not of the attorney.
3.
The. rule is, in general, strictly confined to counsel, solicitors or
attorneys, except, indeed, the case of an interpreter between the
counsel and client, when the privilege rests upon the same grounds of
necessity. 3 Wend. R. 339. In New York, contrary to this general rule,
tinder the statute of that state, it has been decided that information disclosed to a physician while attending upon the defendant in his professional character, which information was necessary to enable the witness to prescribe for his patient, was a confidential communication which the witness need not have testified. about; and in a case where such evidence had been received by the master, it was rejected. 4 Paige, R. 460.
tinder the statute of that state, it has been decided that information disclosed to a physician while attending upon the defendant in his professional character, which information was necessary to enable the witness to prescribe for his patient, was a confidential communication which the witness need not have testified. about; and in a case where such evidence had been received by the master, it was rejected. 4 Paige, R. 460.
4.
As to the matter communicated, it extends to all cases where the party
applies for professional assistance. 6 Mad. R. 47; 14 Pick., R. 416. But
the privilege does not extend to extraneous or impertinent
communications; 3 John. Cas. 198; nor to information imparted to a
counsellor in the character of a friend, and not as counsel. 1 Caines'
R. 157.
5.
The cases in which communications to counsel have been holden not to be
privileged may be classed under the following heads: 1. When the
communication was made before the attorney was employed as such; 1 Vent.
197; 2 Atk. 524; 2. after the attorney's employment has ceased 4 T. R.
431; 3. when the attorney was consulted because he was an attorney, yet
he refused to act as such, and was therefore only applied to as a
friend; 4 T. R. 753; 4. where a fact merely took place in the presence
of the attorney, Cowp. 846; 2 Ves. 189; 2 Curt. Eccl. R. 866; but see
Str. 1122; 5. when the matter communicated was not in its nature
private, and could in no sense be termed the subject of a confidential
communication; 7 East,, R. 357; 2 B. & B. 176; 3 John' Cas. 198; 6.
when the things disclosed had no reference to professional employment,
though disclosed while the relation of attorney and client subsisted;
Peake's R. 77; 7. when the attorney made himself a subscribing witness;
10 Mod. 40 2 Curt. Eccl. R. 866; 3 Burr. 1687
8.
when he was directed to plead the facts to wbich he is called to
testify. 7 N. S. 179. See a well written article! on this subject in the
American Jurist, vol. xvii. p. 304. Vide, generally, Stark. Ev. h. t.; 1
Greenl. Ev. 236-247; 1 Peters' R. 356; 1 Root, 383; Whart. Dig. 275;
Caryls' R. 88, 126, 143; Toth. R. 177; Peake's Cas. 77 2 Stark. Cas.
274; 4 Wash. C. C. R. 718; 11 Wheat. 280; 3 Yeates, R. 4; 4 Munf. R. 273
1 Porter, R. 433; Wright, R. 136; 13 John. R. 492. As to a confession
made to a catholic priest, see 2 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 77. Vide 2 Ch. Pr.
18-21; Confessor.
No comments:
Write comments